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In modern U.S. agriculture, a tenant typically contracts with more than one landlord, 
although most of the past literature has focused exclusively on bilateral contracts with a 
single tenant and a single landlord.  We argue that, in the presence of contractual 
externalities under which the landlords do not cooperatively act, multilateral contracting 
results in higher-powered contracts for the tenant, due to inefficient competition among 
the landlords, and that this incentive effect becomes a motivation for the use of cash 
rental contacts.  Using the USDA’s AELOS data set, we show that the number of 
landlords per tenant indeed increases the likelihood of cash rent and changes the 
qualitative properties of the contract choice equation.  These outcomes provide empirical 
evidence supporting the incentive hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                 
* We are grateful to USDA-NASS and NASS Des Moines Office for allowing us to use 
the AELOS data set.  We carried out the statistical analyses in NASS Des Moines Office, 
following the USDA’s confidentiality policy.  The usual disclaimer applies. Introduction 
The design of economic transactions has been a prominent subject of research in the 
economics of industrial organization.  Lafontaine and Slade (2001) argue that the 
following three areas have received great attention in the empirical literature on 
organizational forms in economic transactions: executive compensation, sales-force and 
franchise contracting, and industrial procurement.  In the area of executive compensation, 
the insurance/incentive aspects of contract theory has been the major interest, while in the 
area of industrial procurement, the role of transaction-specific assets in the design of 
contract has been the major issue (Lafontaine and Slade, 2001).  In the area of sales-force 
and franchise contracting, the main interests include the role of the trade-off between risk 
sharing and incentives in the decision of contracting out (Lafontaine, 1992), the 
relationship between the importance of the agent effort and the decision of contracting 
out (Norton, 1988; Lafontaine, 1992; Shepard, 1993; Slade, 1996), and the relationship 
between monitoring cost and the decision of contracting out (Lafontaine, 1992; Scott, 
1995).  Using the data set of franchising firms from all sectors, Lafontaine (1992) finds 
that the proportion of franchising in a sector increases as the importance of the agent 
effort rises, while the author does not find consistent evidence of risk sharing.  Norton 
  1(1988) and Lafontaine (1992) find that the likelihood of franchising increases as 
monitoring agent effort becomes more costly.  As regards the role of risk and transaction 
costs such as monitoring cost of agent effort and observing cost of realized output, 
farmland lease contracts have been another important area of considerable research
1.  
Allen and Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999) find that the effects of the tenant’s wealth, which is 
used as a proxy for the tenant’s risk aversion, and variability in production on contract 
choice are not consistent with the prediction based on the risk sharing hypothesis that 
contracts with weaker incentives are more likely when the tenant is more risk averse 
and/or when the transaction is more risky.  Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), on the other 
hand, find that the tenant’s wealth has a significant and predicted effect on contract 
choice, once endogenous matching between crop type and the tenant is controlled. 
While bilateral contracts are exclusively used in some transactions, multilateral 
contracts in which a single agent contracts with multiple principals are prevalent in other 
transactions, including farmland leasing in developed countries.  For example, in 
wholesale trade, numerous products are marketed by brokers who often represent the 
potentially conflicting interests of several principals (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986).  In 
farmland leasing in developed countries like the United States, a tenant typically 
  2contracts with multiple landlords.  According to the USDA’s Agricultural Economics and 
Land Ownership Survey (hereafter, AELOS), the average number of landlords per tenant 
was 3.2 in 1988 and 4.4 in 1999.  In developed countries, the body of tenants tends to 
become smaller than that of landlords as the labor productivity increases thanks to 
developed machineries and the number of farmers retiring from farming being greater 
than that of people becoming new farmers. 
Most past empirical studies carried out in various industries, however, have 
focused exclusively on bilateral contracts with a single agent and a single principal.  Lack 
of data on principal attributes partly explains the absence of the empirical literature on 
multilateral contracting.  In the empirical literature on farmland lease contracts, Allen and 
Lueck (1992, 1993, 1999), Laffont and Matoussi (1995), and Bierlen, Parsch, and Dixon 
(1999) have not included landlords’ attributes (except crop type) in the contract-choice 
equation, while there are some studies that control unavailable landlord attributes using 
panel data techniques (Pudney, Galassi, and Mealli, 1998; Dubois, 2002; Ackerberg and 
Botticini, 2002).  To our knowledge, there have been no empirical studies in any sectors 
that focus on the role of multilateral contracting in contract design, except Moss and 
Barry (2002).  Focusing on farmland lease contracts, Moss and Barry (2002) argue 
  3informally that having more landlords increases transaction costs under a cropshare 
contract, and that all else equal, this increases the likelihood of cash rent.  Using a sample 
of 61 Illinois farmers, they tested this hypothesis by looking at the effect of the number of 
landlords on contract choice, and found no significant effect.  Although they include in 
the contract choice equation some landlord attributes such as crop type and information 
on whether or not the landlord is opportunistic, in addition to tenant attributes, the 
available information on landlord attributes is limited.  Furthermore, the sample size may 
not be large enough to capture the effect of multilateral contracting on contract design. 
This article presents some empirical evidence for the effect of multilateral 
contracting on contract design, using a data set from farmland lease contracts in the 
United States.  We overcome the problem of data availability by using AELOS, which is 
a comprehensive data set with a large sample size that contains the information on both 
tenant and landlord attributes.  Taking the advantage of the rich information in AELOS, 
we evaluate empirical determinants that affect contract choice, focusing on the effect of 
the number of landlords that a tenant has.  As far as we know, this is the first article that 
presents empirical evidence on the relationship between multilateral contracting and 
contract design, reasonably controlling both the principal and agent attributes. 
  4In contrast to the lack of empirical studies on multilateral contracting, it is well 
known that multilateral contracting affects the optimal effort level of the agent in the 
literature on contract theory.  Bernheim and Whinston (1986) develop a general model, in 
which they show that the second best cannot generally be achieved in the case of 
multilateral contracting with contractual externalities.  They argue that, in the presence of 
contractual externalities under which cooperation among the principals is not feasible and 
thus each principal strategically designs the contract so that she can elicit greater effort 
from the agent, the competition among the principals results in socially inefficient 
contract design compared to the case without contractual externalities under which the 
principals can cooperatively design contracts.  They argue that contractual externalities 
are likely to exist in both public sectors (e.g., the lack of coordination between state and 
federal agencies) and private sectors (e.g., legislative proscription of explicit cooperation 
between principals).  Dixit (1996) and Itoh (2003) adopt a simple version of multilateral 
contracting model and evaluate how an increase in the number of principals affects the 
design of contract.  They show that, when the risk neutral principals can cooperatively 
design the contract, an increase in the number of principals results in a lower-powered 
incentive contract, because an increase in the number of principals adds additional source 
  5of variability.  This can be understood by considering the case in which a benevolent 
principal representing cooperating principals maximizes the total welfare subject to the 
agent participation and incentive constraints.  The participation of an extra principal 
merely results in greater production variability, while the benevolent principal still 
maximizes the total welfare given the additional variability.  Due to the additional 
variability in the society, the optimal power of incentives for the agent becomes lower.  
On the other hand, when contractual externalities exist and the principals cannot 
cooperate, an increase in the number of principals results in higher-powered incentive 
contracts, because each competing principal strategically designs the contract so that she 
can elicit greater effort for her from the agent and the incentive effect overwhelms the 
loss in the welfare due to inefficient allocation of risk.   
Applying these results to farmland lease contracts, we argue that, such a 
strategic increase in the incentive power for the tenant under the inefficient competition 
among the landlords results in an increase in the tendency for each party to adopt a cash 
rent contract
2.  In this case, an increase in the number of landlords results in lower 
likelihood of cropshare.  On the contrary, when there are no contractual externalities and 
the landlords cooperatively determine contract design, an increase in the number of 
  6landlords results in greater likelihood of cropshare.  This argument leads us to a testable 
hypothesis: in the case in which contractual externalities exist and individual landlords 
strategically determine contract design, then cash rent contracts become more likely.  On 
the same token, evidence that an increase in the number of landlords increases the 
likelihood of cash rent, if any, is consistent with the hypothesis that contractual 
externalities exist.  In contrast to the setting considered in Bernheim and Whinston (1986), 
there is no a priori reason that contractual externalities exist in farmland leasing in the 
United States.  It is possible, although we have not observed the evidence, that landlords 
cooperatively act and design contracts in farmland leasing.  Therefore, it is an interesting 
empirical question whether contractual externalities exist in farmland leasing in U.S. 
agriculture.  By testing the hypothesis above, we provide evidence that contractual 
externalities exist in farmland leasing in U.S. agriculture.  Also, we provide further 
evidence by examining if there are structural differences in the contract choice equations 
under bilateral contracting and multilateral contracting.  If contractual externalities 
actually exist, then the structure of the contract choice equation in multilateral contracting 
should differ from that in bilateral contracting.  In bilateral contracting, contractual 
externalities do not matter at all, because a single landlord contracts with a single tenant, 
  7while contractual externalities affect contract choice in multilateral contracting. 
In addition to investigating the role of contractual externalities in multilateral 
contracting, we provide careful discussion on the specification of econometric models of 
contract choice, which has been informally and somewhat carelessly done in the past 
literature.  We argue that the contract choice equation is likely highly nonlinear in 
parameters, and provide empirical evidence for it.   The result indicates that the past 
studies that ignore nonlinear structure of the contract choice equation may be subject to 
misspecification bias. 
Data 
AELOS is a comprehensive data set consisting of tenants’ demographic information, 
economic attributes and household characteristics, and landlords’ demographic 
information and economic attributes.  Survey questionnaires were first sent to 
producers/tenants all over the United States.  They were asked to answer certain questions 
and to provide the addresses and names of their landlords.  Then questionnaires were sent 
to those listed landlords.  This procedure makes it possible for us to identify a tenant and 
a landlord for every contract in the data set.  In the United States, a tenant usually has 
more than one landlord.  Reflecting this fact, the information for a tenant may appear 
  8more than once in our data set but in combination with the information for different 
landlords.  In other words, in our data set, the sample unit of the data is not an individual 
tenant or landlord, but a contract between a tenant and a landlord.  After deleting 
unusable observations and refining the data set, we have a total of 44,515 observations 
(contracts) in the data set
3.  The number of tenants in the data set is 12,212 and the 
average number of landlords per tenant is 4.94 (the standard deviation is 6.71)
4. 
Empirical Methods and Results 
Our empirical analysis is comprised of three phases.  In the first phase, we observe the 
correlation between the number of landlords and the proportion of cash rent.  This 
provides us with preliminary evidence for the correlation between the number of 
landlords and the likelihood of cash rent.  In the second phase, we carry out simple 
regression analyses to examine the causal relationship between the number of landlords 
and the likelihood of cash rent.  In the third phase, we evaluate the potential endogeneity 
problem of the choice between bilateral and multilateral contracting in the contract choice 
equation, and see if this endogeneity problem affects our conclusions in the second phase. 
First, we provide preliminary evidence that an increase in the number of 
landlords is positively correlated with the likelihood of cash rent.  Table 1 shows the 
  9percentage of cropshare by the tenant farm type and the number of landlords.  When we 
compare the proportions of cropshare between bilateral contracting and multilateral 
contracting (upper half of Table 1), we find that the proportion of cropshare is greater 
under bilateral contracting than under multilateral contracting, except for beef farms and 
farms raising other livestock.  For beef farms and farms raising other livestock, the 
proportion of cropshare is greater under multilateral contracting, although the difference 
is not statistically significant.  When we compare the proportions of cropshare between 
the tenants with more than one and less than five landlords and those with equal to or 
more than five landlords (lower half of Table 1), we find that the proportion of cropshare 
is smaller and the proportion of cash rent is greater as the number of landlords is greater, 
except for beef farms.  These results are generally consistent with the hypothesis that 
contractual externalities exist and competition among landlords results in greater 
likelihood of cash rent.   
Although this descriptive analysis shows that an increase in the number of 
landlords is positively correlated with the likelihood of cash rent, this does not 
necessarily suggest the causal relationship that an increase in the number of landlords 
increases the likelihood of cash rent.  If there is a variable that is correlated with both the 
  10number of landlords and the likelihood of cash rent, then the positive correlation found 
above is not a causal but a pseudo relationship.  In order for us to evaluate the true 
relationship between the number of landlords and contract design, we use regression 
analysis. 
First, we carefully specify the econometric model as follows.  Consider the 
contract between tenant i and his j-th landlord, landlord ij.  We denote the type of contract 
between tenant i and landlord ij by  , where  ij c 1 ij c =  when the contract is cropshare, and 
  when the contract is cash rent.  The landlord-tenant party obtains the social 
welfare    from the transaction when the party chooses cropshare, while the party 
obtains   from the transaction when the party chooses cash rent.  In addition, suppose 
that there are exogenous net benefits when the landlord-tenant pair chooses a cash rent 
contract.  Such benefits include, for example, savings in self-employment tax and receipt 
of full amount of social security payments.  If landlords “materially participate” in 
production, the income from the transaction is subject to self-employment tax





5.  Since 
landlords typically participate in management under cropshare and are considered to 
materially participate in production, landlords would have motivations to use cash rent.  
In addition, prior to 2000, landlords age 65 and older on social security retirement were 
  11required to count material participation income or other earned income toward the 
maximum amount of income that they may earn before social security retirement benefits 
are reduced.  The income from cash rent is not generally earned income and thus is not 
counted toward the maximum amount of income that they may earn before social security 
retirement benefits are reduced.  This may also motivate landlords to use cash rent.  On 
the other hand, landlords have to materially participate in farming for at least five years 
before death to be eligible for estate tax reduction.  This may motivate landlords to use 
cropshare.  Denote the net benefits of cash rent for landlord ij described above by  ij B .  
We assume that  ij B  is observed by the landlord-tenant party but cannot be observed by 
econometricians.  We assume that, from the perspectives of econometricians,  ij B  is a 
random variable that follows a standard normal distribution.  The landlord-tenant party 
chooses cash rent if and only if  
(1) 
10
ij ij ij WWB < +  
From the perspective of econometricians, the probability that the party chooses cash rent 
is  , and the probability that the party chooses cropshare is  , 
where Φ stands for the c.d.f. for standard normal distribution.  In the past literature, it 
has been implicitly assumed that the difference in the social welfare,  , can be 
10 1( ij ij WW −Φ − )
0
10 () ij ij WW Φ−
1
ij ij WW −
  12approximated by a linear function of proxies for risk preference, risk, transaction costs, 
and other factors.  However, in general,    is not a linear function of these 
variables.  Therefore, we include nonlinear terms constructed from our proxies in the 
contract choice equation, and examine if there is evidence for nonlinearity.  Our 
econometric model can be written as  
1




ij ij ij cX B β = −  
where   is a latent variable such that 
*
ij c 1 ij c =  when   and 
* 0 ij c > 0 ij c =  when  , 
* 0 ij c ≤ ij X  
is a vector of regressors, and β  is a vector of coefficients.   ij X β  is our approximation of  
.  Therefore, positive coefficient estimates mean that an increase in the variable 
increases the probability that cropshare is chosen, while negative coefficient estimates 
mean that an increase in the variable decreases the probability that cropshare is chosen.  
The proxies include a tenant farm type dummy variable, the number of landlords, tenant 
total assets, a dummy variable that indicates whether the landlord lives on the contracted 
land, landlord assets on the contracted land, county-level crop yield variability, and 
county-level erodibility index among others.  The definitions and descriptive statistics of 
these variables are given in Table 2.  The vector of regressors also includes nonlinear 
terms of the proxies.   
1
ij ij WW −
0
  13The most important variable that we are interested in is, of course, the number 
of total landlords that the tenant contracts with, denoted by  .  However, this variable 
may be subject to a problem of measurement error, because the true variable we want to 
use is the number of other competing landlords for a specific landlord, denoted by  , 
and   is not always an exact measurement of  , as we explain below.  Consider the 
following two cases.  In the first case, suppose that all the existing contracts are 
renegotiated simultaneously, along with new contracts, if any.  In this case,   minus one 
is equal to   for all j, and therefore,   can be used as an exact measurement of  .  
In the second case, suppose that the existing contracts are not renegotiated once the 
landlord-tenant pairs set the contracts.  In this case,   depends on the order of the 
participation of landlord ij.    is greater for a landlord who enters the transaction with 
the tenant at a later time.    is not an exact measurement of  , and we do not have an 
exact measure of  , since the data on the order of landlord participation are not 
available in our data set.  Note, however, that   is positively correlated with   even in 
the latter case.  Because of the positive correlation, the use of   instead of   should 



























Table 3 shows the summary of the effects of the number of landlords in the 
  14contract choice equation for the linear and nonlinear specifications.  In the linear 
specification, the coefficient estimate for the number of landlords is -0.0084 and it is 
statistically significant, which implies that an increase in the number of landlords 
decreases the likelihood of cropshare.  In the nonlinear specification, the average of the 
marginal effect of an increase in the number of landlords is -0.0042, which indicates that 
an increase in the number of landlords decreases the likelihood of cropshare on average.  
These results, therefore, are consistent with the hypothesis that contractual externalities 
exist, and they affect contract choice in a way that principals choose contracts with 
stronger incentives than those in the absence of contractual externalities.  The joint test of 
the hypothesis that all the nonlinear terms are zero is rejected
6, which implies that the 
term    is indeed a nonlinear function of the proxies.  This result implies that 
models with linear specification may be subject to specification bias.  Although the 
qualitative result does not change between the linear and nonlinear specifications, this 
may be due to a large sample size of our data set. 
1
ij ij WW −
0
Next, we examine whether there exist structural differences between bilateral 
and multilateral contracting.    In order to test the structural differences, we carry out the 
Chow-type test (Greene, 2000).  The data set is divided into two categories, depending on 
  15whether a tenant has only one landlord (regime 1) or multiple landlords (regime 2).  
Evidence that the estimated coefficients in the contract choice equations across the two 
regimes are not identical indicates that there exist contractual externalities in the 
transaction, and the externalities affect contract choice.  We do not include nonlinear 
terms in the model for simplicity purpose, but exclusion of nonlinear terms should not 
affect the result qualitatively, given that having nonlinear terms in the equation does not 
affect qualitative result in our data set, as the analysis above shows.  The test rejects the 
hypothesis that all the coefficient estimates are identical across the two regimes
7.  Thus, 
we conclude that there exist structural differences in the contract choice equations 
between bilateral contracting and multilateral contracting, and this provides further 
evidence for the hypothesis that contractual externalities affect contract choice. 
The simple probit analysis above does not consider the possibility that contract 
choice may be correlated with the regime selection between bilateral and multilateral 
contracting.  If the two are correlated, the estimates shown in Table 3 may be biased.  
There is a reason that we have to worry about this problem.  Since bigger farmers tend to 
have more landlords, and bigger farmers may be less risk averse, the size of farm may 
affect both the number of landlords and contract choice simultaneously.  If this is the case, 
  16the number of landlords is not a dependent variable, not an independent variable.  
Without considering this potential endogeneity problem, the coefficient estimates of the 
contract equation may suffer from bias.  In order to consider the endogeneity problem, we 
estimate a bivariate probit model in which contract type and regime are simultaneously 
determined.  By explicitly allowing the correlation between the contract choice and the 
regime selection, we can simultaneously assess the effect of the potential endogeneity 
problem.  In the bivariate probit model, we allow the coefficients of the contract choice 
equations in regime 1 and regime 2 to differ, because we find that the coefficients are not 
identical in the analysis above.  We do not include nonlinear terms in the model in order 
to facilitate convergence.  Exclusion of nonlinear terms, however, should not affect the 
result qualitatively, as we observe that having nonlinear terms in the equation does not 
affect qualitative result in the analysis above.  Table 4 shows the results.  We find that the 
estimated correlation in the disturbance terms has a negative sign, which implies that the 
tendency of multilateral contracting is negatively correlated with the likelihood of 
cropshare, although the effect is statistically insignificant.  The result implies that the 
endogeneity problem does not significantly affect the contract choice.  Moreover, the 
coefficient estimate for the number of landlords in the contract choice equation in 
  17multilateral contracting is negative and significant, indicating that an increase in the 
number of landlords decreases the likelihood of cropshare under multilateral contracting.  
These findings are consistent with those in Table 3.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
negative effect of the number of landlords on the likelihood of cropshare is robust to the 
possible endogeneity problem in contract choice. 
Discussion 
Although multilateral contracting is one of the important characteristics in some areas, it 
has received little attention in the empirical literature to date.  In this article, we carry out 
a case study using a data set from farmland lease contracts in U.S. agriculture.  Farmer 
tenants often have more than one landlord, and multilateral contracting appears in 
farmland leasing in modern U.S. agriculture.  We argue that cash rent becomes more 
likely as the number of landlords increases, provided that multi-tasking for different 
landlords is more costly for the tenant, and contractual externalities exist and 
coordination between landlords is absent.  In the presence of contractual externalities, 
there are more landlords who provide greater incentives to the tenant in order to elicit 
greater effort from the tenant.  We find that the number of landlords per tenant indeed 
increases the likelihood of cash rent contracts, and the result is robust to nonlinear 
  18specification, and endogenous regime selection between bilateral and multilateral 
contracting.  Also, we find that the structure of contract choice equation under bilateral 
contracting is different from that under multilateral contracting, which provides another 
evidence for the effect of contractual externalities on the design of farmland lease 
contracts. 
Although we find some supporting evidence for the effect of contractual 
externalities on contract design, the results do not necessarily insist the incentive 
hypothesis against alternative hypotheses.  Especially, the result that and increase in the 
number of landlords increases the likelihood of cash rent is also consistent with the 
transaction cost hypothesis suggested by Moss and Barry (2002).  They argue that, as the 
number of landlords increases, a tenant faces higher transaction costs under cropshare, 
because more record keeping, more reporting, more communications with the landlords, 
and greater coordination between the landlords are required.  Transaction costs under 
cash rent are generally small because no reporting is required and the landlord’s 
participation in management is rare.  Because of these reasons, the likelihood of 
cropshare presumably decreases as the number of landlords increases.   
To distinguish the effect of contractual externalities from the effect of 
  19transaction costs is an interesting task for future research.  Having variables that are 
correlated with the transaction costs but not with contractual externalities in the 
regression analysis would be useful for this purpose.  Such variables may include the 
average transaction costs spent by the tenant.  Empirical evidence that the average 
transaction costs are increasing in the number of landlords would also support the 
transaction cost hypothesis.  Variables that are correlated with inter-landlords relationship 
can be used to further test the incentive hypothesis.  For example, if the residences of 
landlords are further away from each other, then it may be more difficult for them to 
cooperate, and thus contractual externalities may be greater.  If this is true, then the 
average distance from each landlord would increase the likelihood of cash rent.  To our 
knowledge, there are only a couple of empirical studies, including this article, that 
evaluate the effect of multilateral contracting on contract design.  Further empirical and 
theoretical analyses would be therefore necessary for better understanding the effect of 
multilateral contracting on contract design. 
  20Footnotes 
 
1 In farmland lease contracts, the landlord is the principal who contracts out farming, 
while the tenant is the agent who farms the contracted land for the landlord. 
2 The discussion below on the effect of contractual externalities on contract design, and 
specification of econometric models is based on a modified version of Dixit (1996) and 
Itoh (2003) that we develop for this article.  The detailed description of the model is 
provided in Appendix. 
3 We need to refine the data set in order to use it for analyzing contract choice.  In 
particular, non-random data selection problem may affect the estimation of the contract 
choice equation.  Fukunaga and Huffman (2006) find that, however, the selection 
problem does not affect qualitative estimation result of the contract choice equation in the 
data set.  See Fukunaga and Huffman (2006), pages 6-8 for the detailed discussion on the 
data refinement.  
4 This average number of landlords per tenant is not the same as that reported on page 3 
because of the data refinement stated above. 
5 A landlord is materially participating if he/she has an arrangement with the tenant for 
  21 
the landlord participation and the landlord meets one of the four following tests: 
Test No. 1. The landlord does any three of the following: 1) advance, pay, or stand good 
for at least half the direct cost of producing the crop; 2) furnish at least half the tools, 
equipment, and livestock used in producing the crop; 3) consult with your tenant; and 4) 
inspect the production activities periodically. 
Test No. 2. The landlord regularly and frequently makes, or takes an important part in 
making, management decisions substantially contributing to or affecting the success of 
the enterprise. 
Test No. 3. The landlord works 100 hours or more spread over a period of five weeks or 
more in activities connected with crop production. 
Test No. 4. The landlord does things that, considered in their total effect, show that 
he/she is materially and significantly involved in the production of the farm commodities. 
6 The chi-squared statistics is 1838.88, which is great enough to reject the null hypothesis 
at the 1% significance level. 
7 The chi-squared statistics is 83.56, which is great enough to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 1% significance level. 
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  26Table 1. The Percentage of Cropshare by Tenant Farm Type and the Number of 
Landlords 
Tenant Farm Type Single Landlord Multiple Landlords Difference
Grain-Oilseed 0.3573 0.3129 0.0444*
Tobacco-Cotton 0.3355 0.2012 0.1343*
Vegetable-Friut 0.1692 0.0941 0.0751*
Beef 0.1278 0.1430 -0.0152
Dairy 0.0829 0.0318 0.0511*
Other Livestock 0.1235 0.1298 -0.0063
Tenant Farm Type 1<Landlords<5 5<=Landlords Difference
Grain-Oilseed 0.413 0.2841 0.1289*
Tobacco-Cotton 0.3818 0.175 0.2068*
Vegetable-Friut 0.1396 0.08 0.0596*
Beef 0.1285 0.1564 -0.0279*
Dairy 0.0397 0.0281 0.0116*
Other Livestock 0.1287 0.1307 -0.002  
Note: An asterisk indicates the difference is significant at the 1% level.
  27Table 2. Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions Mean S.D.
Dependent variables
CONTRACT_TYPE
=1 if contract is cropshare, =0 if
contract is cash rent 0.20 0.40
REGIME
=1 if tenant has more than one




=1 if location of tenant's farm is
Northwest region 0.12 0.33
MW
=1 if location of tenant's farm is
Midwest region 0.37 0.48
SR
=1 if location of tenant's farm is
South region 0.35 0.48
WR
=1 if location of tenant's farm is
West region 0.16 0.36
Tenant's farm type
CROP_TYPE
=1 if tenant farm type is grain,
oilseed, tobacco, or cotton 0.52 0.50
Other tenant's attributes
T_AGE age of tenant 51.65 12.09
T_TOTAL_ASSET
value of farm and nonfarm assets
in tenant's household ($100,000) 23.86 67.53
N_LANDLORDS
number of landlords whom tenant
contract with 13.35 19.83
Landlord's attributes
L_AGE age of landlord 65.09 14.47
L_LIV_ON_FARM
=1 if landlord lives on contracted
land 0.13 0.34
L_TOTAL_VALUE
market value of all lands and





production variability for county of
tenant's residence 0.26 0.10
ERODIBILITY
erodibility index for county of
tenant's residence 2.68 2.72 
  28Table 3. Probit Model of Contract Choice (Probability of Cropshare Being Chosen) 












Average Marginal Effect -0.0084 -0.0042  
Note: Three asterisks indicate the estimate is significant at the 1% level.  Two asterisks 
indicate the estimate is significant at the 5% level.
  29Table 4. Bivariate Probit Model of Contract and Regime Choices 


















Note: Three asterisks indicate the estimate is significant at the 1% level.  Two asterisks 
indicate the estimate is significant at the 5% level.  An asterisk indicates the estimate is 




  30Appendix 
The model discussed here is adopted from Itoh (2003) and was originally developed by 
Dixit (1996).  We develop the model further so that we can explicitly discuss the 
conditions under which cash rent is more preferred.  With the simple model, it can be 
shown that an increase in the number of landlords increases the likelihood of cash rent in 
the presence of contractual externalities, that there are structural differences in the 
contract choice equations between bilateral contracting and multilateral contracting, and 
that the contract choice equations is in general nonlinear in parameters.  Formal modeling 
with more general settings remains to be our future task, although we believe that the 
same results are likely to hold.   
We consider the following two regimes: in regime 1, there are n landlords and 
each of them contracts with a tenant; in regime 2, there are n landlords and they contract 
with the same tenant.  Suppose that the production function for landlord j is given by  
(A-1)  j jj yL δ = +  
where  j L  is the tenant’s effort level provided for landlord j, and  j δ  is an unobservable 
disturbance factor that follows a normal distribution, 
2 (0, ) j N σ .  Landlord j receives 
revenue 1 per unit of output.  Landlord j utilizes a linear contract denoted as 
  31j jj j wy α β =+ .  Furthermore, it is assumed that the landlords are risk neutral while the 
tenant is risk averse (constant absolute risk averse, CARA is assumed too), and the 
Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient is denoted by r.  The reservation utility of the tenant 
is denoted as  .  0 U
Regime 1 One-on-one contract 
This is the standard principal-agent model that Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) presented.  













Regime 2 n landlords and one tenant, and the landlords act non-cooperatively 
Now, let us consider the case in which   landlords contract with the same tenant.  
Here, we consider the case in which the landlords behave non-cooperatively.  The tenant 
allocates his efforts to n landlords’ plots of land.  Namely, the tenant makes effort 
(2 ) n ≥
j L  for 
landlord j.  The production function is given by equation (A-1), but now we assume that 



















⎟ .  Let the tenant’s private cost function be  '
2
1
) ( LCL L C = , where 
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1 0 > k 0 s ≤ ≤ .  The parameter s can 
be interpreted as the degree of the externalities of efforts: when s = 0, there is no 
externality between the tenant’s efforts, while when s is greater than 0, externality exists 
and the efforts have substitution effects.  That is, when s is greater than 0, greater efforts 
for one landlord increase the marginal cost of the efforts for other landlords. 
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where  1 (,, ) n α αα = " .  Solving the first order condition with respect to L, one obtains  
(A-4) 
1 L C α
− =  
This is the incentive compatibility condition for the tenant (we assume that the first order 
approach is valid in this problem).  Since the participation constraint for the tenant holds 
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The solution for  j β  cannot be determined unless further assumptions are made.  Here, for 
simplicity purposes, we assume that each landlord makes the equal amount of fixed 
payment.  That is,  








= ∑  
Given these constraints for the landlords, landlord j’s objective function becomes 
  { } max (1 )

























Plugging this into equation (A-5) and divide it by n, one can obtain the fixed part of the 
payment, 
**
j β .  From equation (A-7), the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 1. Suppose that substituting effects exist among the tenant’s efforts for 
different landlords, and that contractual externalities exist and the landlords non-
cooperatively determines the contract terms.  Then, the optimal share of output for the 
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Also, one can readily show 
** *
2 | jj αα 0 − > .  These complete the proof. Q.E.D. 
  34Proposition 1 indicates that the power of incentives provided by the optimal contracts 
becomes stronger as the number of landlords increases given that there is an externality 
between the tenant’s efforts for the multiple landlords and contractual externalities exist.  
This result seems consistent with the hypothesis that a cash rent contract is more likely as 
the tenant contracts with more landlords, because cash rent provides stronger incentives 
to the tenant than cropshare.  However, because the optimal contract represented by 
** ** (, jj ) α β  is not generally a cash rent contract (actually, it is the optimal cropshare 
contract, as long as  ), we need more formal discussion in order to clarify the 
implication of proposition 1 and derive a testable prediction based on the proposition.  In 
the following, we attempt to derive a testable prediction based explicitly on the formal 
model.   
** 0 j α << 1
For that purpose, we use the social welfares in regime 1 and regime 2.  The 
social welfare is the sum of the landlords’ welfare and the tenants’ welfare.  In regime 1, 
there are n landlords and n tenants and each of them independently contracts.  The social 
welfare in regime 1 becomes  
  35(A-8) 
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In the right hand side of the first row, the principal j’s welfare appears in the first 
parentheses, and the tenant j’s welfare appears in the second parentheses.  Since the 
payments are income transfers between the landlords and the tenants, the contractual 
terms do not directly appear in the social welfare function, although, of course, they still 
play the central role in determining the social welfare by affecting the tenant’s effort level. 
Similarly, in regime 2, the social welfare when the landlords make contracts with one 
tenant is given by  
(A-9) 
()
** ** ** ** ** ** ** 2 2
2
11
** 2 ** **
0
1
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The first summation represents the sum of the landlords’ welfares while the rest terms 
represent the tenant’s welfare.  The second term represents the welfare for the tenant who 
contracts with n landlords in regime 2.  The last term represents the sum of reservation 
utilities of the   tenants who are out of leasing in regime 2.  1 n−
  36Now, in regime 1, suppose that the landlords choose cash rent contracts.  The 
optimal effort level under cash rent is 1 k .  In addition, suppose that there is an external 
source of gain for the landlords when they use cash rent.  Examples of such an external 
source of gain are savings in self-employment tax, full receipt of social security benefits, 
potential savings in estate tax, etc.  Denote such an external benefit under cash rent by  j B .  
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Similarly to the above, suppose that the landlords choose cash rent contracts in regime 2.  
The optimal effort level is now 1( 1( 1 ) ) kn s + − .  The social welfare under cash rent 
contracts becomes  
(A-11) 
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Then, it is optimal to choose cash rent if and only if  
(A-12)    11 , in regime 1
C WW >
  37(A-13)    22 , in regime 2
C WW >






0, in regime 1
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=∑ .  Then, 
Proposition 2. For sufficiently large value of s, the lowest value of B that satisfies the 
condition (A-15) is smaller than the counterpart for the condition (A-14). 
Proof.  We show that, for sufficiently great value of s, the LHS of inequality (A-14) 
except for the B term is greater than the LHS of inequality (A-15) except for the B term 
so that inequality (A-15) can hold with a smaller value of B.  To show this, we note that 
the LHS of inequality (A-15) becomes identical with the LHS of inequality (A-14) when 
.  Therefore, it suffices to show that the LHS of inequality (A-15) becomes greater 
than the LHS of inequality of (A-14) for 
0 s =
s s > , where  s  is some sufficiently great value.  
Although cumbersome, one can show that the LHS of inequality of (A-15) is in general 
U-shaped in s.  The graphs of  2
C WW 2 −  in cases of  2,3,4,5,6 n =  are shown in the figure 
below.  As the figure shows, the value of  2
C WW 2 −  becomes greater than   for  11
C WW −
  38some sufficiently great value of s.  Although the specific parameter values are used in the 
figure, the shapes and the qualitative properties are robust to other parameter values.  
Q.E.D. 








Figure A1.   as a function of s for  2 −
C WW 2 ,,,, = 23456 n  ( )  (, , )( . , , ) σ
2 0511 j kr =
Proposition 2 implies that, when the substituting effects between the tenant’s efforts are 
sufficiently large, the domain of B such that cash rent is more preferred is narrower in 
regime 1 than in regime 2, meaning that the likelihood of cash rent contracts is greater as 
the shift from regime 1 to regime 2 occurs. 
The next proposition claims that an increase in the number of landlords in 
regime 2 increases the likelihood of cash rent. 
Proposition 3. The lowest value of B per contract that satisfies the condition that cash 
  39rent contracts are more likely in regime 2 becomes smaller as the number of landlords, n, 
increases. 
Proof.  A calculation shows that the value of the LHS of the condition (A-15) except for 
the B term and the risk term is decreasing in n and the rate of decrease is decreasing (see 
the figure below).  This implies that the smallest value of B per contract that satisfies the 
condition becomes smaller as n increases.  This completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 







Figure A2.   as a function of n: ( )  22 −
C WW ( ,,,) (,,,.) σ
2 11109 j krs=
Because cash rent is sub-optimal from the perspective of incentives and risk-
sharing, the inefficiency when cash rent is used becomes greater as the number of 
landlords increases.  Proposition 3 above implies that the marginal increase in the loss 
  40becomes less as the number of landlords increases, because the optimal share for the 
tenant becomes closer to unity, and thus smaller increase in B is needed so that cash rent 
becomes more likely. 
Now, using the analysis above, we state the predictions that we test in the 
empirical analysis.  First, from proposition 2, we have the following prediction: 
Prediction 1. Cash rent becomes more likely when the tenant contracts with multiple 
landlords, compared to the case in which the tenant contracts with only one landlord. 
Proposition 3 leads us to the next prediction: 
Prediction 2. Cash rent becomes more likely as the number of landlords per tenant 
increases, given that the tenant contracts with multiple landlords. 
Finally, from equations (A-14) and (A-15), we obtain predictions 3 and 4: 
Prediction 3. The contract choice equation consists of highly nonlinear terms of proxies. 
Prediction 4. The coefficients of the equation of contract choice when the tenant 
contracts with one landlord are not the same as those when the tenant contracts with 
multiple landlords. 
In the discussion above, it is assumed that all the landlords choose the same type 
of contract.  This is obviously a strong assumption.  In reality, one tenant can have 
  41different types of contracts with different landlords at the same time.  In the following, 
we consider whether relaxing this assumption alters our conclusion.  For that purpose, we 
consider a simple case in which there are two identical landlords (identical except for the 
exogenous benefits of cash rent,  1 B  and  2 B ) and one tenant.  This is a preliminary 
analysis and the more general case is left for further work.   
In the model, it is assumed that the landlords act non-cooperatively and move 
simultaneously.  Figure A3 is the payoff matrix for the game.   through   stand for 
payoffs for each landlord-tenant pair for the corresponding strategy, which do not include 
the exogenous benefit of cash rent. 
1 W 8 W
Pair 2   
Cash Rent  Cropshare 
Cash Rent  ( , )  1 W 2 W ( , )  3 W 4 W
Pair 1 
Cropshare  ( , )  5 W 6 W ( , )  7 W 8 W
Figure A3. Payoff matrix 
Because the landlords are identical except for  1 B  and  2 B , we have the following 
relationships: ;  ; 12 WW = 36 WW = 4 WW 5 = ; and  7 WW 8 = .  Define the total welfares 
excluding  1 B  and  2 B  in each cell as follows:  12 CC WW W = + ;  34 CS WW W = + ; 
; and  .  It readily follows that  5 SC WW W =+ 6 8 7 SS WW W =+ SC CS WW = .  Furthermore, one 
  42can show that  .    SS CS CS CC WWWW −≥−
Depending on the value of  1 B  and  2 B , any combination of strategies can be an 
equilibrium, given that  1 B  and  2 B  can be transferred between the pairs without cost.  To 
show this, define such an allocation   of exogenous benefit between the pairs, 
where   stands for the allocation of the exogenous benefits for Pair 1 and   stands for 
the allocation for Pair 2.  As such, either bb
12 (, ) bb
1 b 2 b
12 1 B + = 12 2 bb B ,  + = 2 , or   
holds.  Suppose that 
12 1 bb BB +=+
1 SS CS B WW ≥−.  Then there is always a feasible allocation of  1 B  
such that   and  .  This implies that if  31 WbW +≥ 7 8 42 WbW +≥ 1 B  is great enough, then 
Cash-Share is an equilibrium.  Similarly, if  2 SS SC B WW ≥−, then there is always a feasible 
allocation of  2 B  such that   and  51 WbW +≥ 7 8 62 WbW + ≥ , and Share-Cash is an 
equilibrium.  Whether or not the pairs want to move from Cash-Share (or Share-Cash) to 
Cash-Cash, again, depends on the value of  1 B  and  2 B .  If  2 B  (or  1 B ) is great enough such 
that   and   hold, then the pairs will move from Cash-Share (or 
Share-Cash, respectively) to Cash-Cash and the equilibrium will be in the upper-left cell.  
Now, noting that  , we can argue that it is easier for the pairs to 
move from Cash-Share (or Share-Cash) to Cash-Cash than to move from Share-Share to 
Cash-Share (or Share-Cash), in the sense that smaller value of 
11 WbW +≥ 3 4 22 WbW +≥
SS CS CS CC WWWW −≥−
2 B  (or  1 B , respectively) is 
  43needed to motivate them to shift to Cash-Cash.  In other words, once one landlord 
deviates from cropshare to cash rent, the other landlord is more likely to deviate from 
cropshare to cash rent.   
Now, suppose that there are two bilateral contracts, and there are no externalities 
between the two transactions.  Suppose that one pair moves from the optimal cropshare to 
cash rent.  Denoting the loss in the social welfare by  S WW C − , one can show that, for 
great enough s, the loss in the social welfare in the presence of externalities is smaller 
than that in the absence of externalities.  That is, for great enough s,  .  
This implies that it is easier for a pair to move from Share to Cash when the externality is 
great enough, in the sense that smaller value of external benefits of cash rent is needed to 
motivate them to shift to Cash. 
SC S SC WWW W −≥ − S
The following provides analytical description of the discussion above.  We 
focus on the likelihood that one pair chooses a cash rent contract, given the other party’s 
contract type.  Suppose that  1 B  and  2 B  are independently and randomly distributed from 
the perspective of researchers.  We first consider the case in which there exist 
externalities.  The probability that Pair 1 chooses a cash rent contract can be written as 
Prob(Pair 1 chooses cash rent | Pair 2 chooses cropshare)+Prob(Pair 1 chooses cash rent | 
  44Pair 2 chooses cash rent).  The first term can be written as 
Prob( )·Prob( )= Prob( 1 CS SS WB W +≥ 2 SS SC WWB ≥+ 1 SS CS B WW ≥−)·Prob( 2 SS SC B WW ≤−), 
while the second term can be written as 
Prob( )·Prob( 12 CC SC WB B WB ++≥ + 2 2 SC SS WB W + ≥ )=Prob( 1 SC CC B WW ≥−) 
·Prob( 2 SS SC B WW ≥−).  Thus, the probability that Pair 1 chooses cash rent, denoted by  , 
is   =Prob(
1 P
1 P 1 SS CS B WW ≥−)·Prob( 2 SS SC B WW ≤ − )+ 
Prob( 1 SC CC B WW ≥−)·Prob( 2 SS SC B WW ≥−).  Now, if  SC S SC WWW W S − >− holds, then 
>Prob( 1 P 1 SC B WW ≥−)·Prob( 2 SS CS B WW ≤ − )+ 
Prob( 1 SC B WW ≥−)·Prob( 2 SS SC B WW ≥−)=Prob( 1 SC B WW ≥−).  Note that 
Prob( 1 SC B WW ≥−) is the probability that a landlord-tenant pair chooses a cash rent 
contract in the absence of externalities.  Thus, we want to show that   
is true at least for some value of s.   
SC S SC WWW W −> − S
We define a function  .  Note that  ( ) ( ) ( ) SS CS Ws W s W s ∆= − (0) SC WW W ∆ =−.  
One can show that, for great enough s,  (0) ( ) WW s ∆ >∆ .  This implies that, for great 
enough s, the loss in the social welfare when a landlord-tenant pair moves from the 
optimal cropshare contract to a cash rent contract in the presence of externalities is 
smaller than that in the absence of externalities.  Intuitively, this is because the optimal 
  45share is close to unity when s is great enough, and thus the loss in the social welfare, 
which mainly arises due to greater risk burdens for the tenant, is small.  If this is the case, 
it is easier for a landlord-tenant pair to move from the optimal cropshare contract to a 
cash rent contract in the presence of externalities than in the absence of externalities. 
The discussion above indicates that our main argument that contractual 
externalities can increase the likelihood of cash rent contracts is robust to the assumption 
that landlords can choose different types of contracts, in the case where there are two 
landlords and one tenant, and exogenous benefits for cash rent can be transferred between 
the parties without cost.  Extending this framework to more general settings is left for 
future task.   
  46